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The recently introduced Health Children and Families Act represents a potential $15B 
investment in promoting community health by legislating the implementation of the 
Nurse-Family Partnerships (NFP) program in all 50 states. Although legislation does not 
mandate the implementation strategy, civic collaboration has been found to be uniquely 
successful. To fully leverage the value of civic collaboration, this study aims to identify 
and formalize one important aspect of collaborative activity—the growth process during 
the initial stages of collaboration. By comparing field observations from several 
community health programs, we have identified the features of civic collaborations most 
associated with favorable program outcomes. Specifically, successful collaborations have 
started with small initial groups, proceeded to engage in high quality planning processes, 
and have slowly included new members. Using a coordination game model from 
experimental economics, we formalize strategic behaviors in civic collaboration as a 
minimum-effort coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Three best practices 
(small initial group, planning, and growth) observed from the field are interpreted as 
interventions in coordination failures within the game. This coordination game 
framework is incorporated into an agent-based model. A series of experiments in the 
agent-based model offer an in-depth understanding of the separate and combined effects 
of the three best practices and how their contributions change over the lifecycle of a civic 
collaboration program. Findings from this study not only inform the program 
implementation of Healthy Children and Families Act, but also help stakeholders in other 








WASHINGTON, D.C. – United States Senator Ken Salazar (D-CO), along with Senator 
Arlen Specter (R-PA), ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies, last week 
introduced the bipartisan Healthy Children and Families Act. The Healthy Children and 
Families Act would expand access to the highly-successful Nurse-Family Partnership 
through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, providing at-home nurse visits for up to 570,000 first-time mothers 
each year.  
 
    - from an April 3rd, 2007 Senatorial press release 
Introduction 
Civic collaborations, also known as collaborative partnerships, are alliances among 
community stakeholders and organizations from multiple sectors that work together to 
improve conditions with the aim of promoting and sustaining community health; as a 
strategy, such civic collaborations are increasing in frequency (Roussos & Fawcett, 
2000). Federal and State health agencies routinely support, and often mandate, the 
formation of collaborative partnerships to design and implement community health 
initiatives (Hicks, et. al., submitted 2006). The Institute of Medicine defines “mobilizing 
community partnerships” as an essential public health service, and the National Public 
Health Performance Standards include the use of collaborative partnership as a key 
indicator of effective performance (Zahner, 2005).  
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To fully leverage the value of civic collaborations, this research aims at 
identifying and formalizing best practices of such collaborations. Specifically, Hicks et. 
al. (submitted 2006) found a correlation between program outcomes and the process 
quality of the early phases of civic collaboration development in Colorado. It was during 
this early phase that the collaborations grew from just a few participants to a function 
group. By evaluating implementations of the Nurse-Family Partnership, and particularly 
by understanding the successes and struggles during the growth process when employing 
civic partnerships used to implement NFP in Colorado, we can derive insights into best 
practices. The direction of this research is motivated by and builds on previous and 
current research into civic collaborations as a viable strategy for community health 
programs (Hicks & Larson, 2003; Johnston & Hicks, 2004; Hicks et. al., submitted 
2006).  
Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) 
The Nurse-Family Partnership is perhaps the single most effective public health program 
in the US (Isaacs, 2007). Conceived by Dr. David Olds, the Partnership sends specially 
trained nurses on weekly or bi-weekly visits to low-income, first-time mothers, beginning 
as early as possible in the pregnancy—typically between 16 and 28 weeks— 
and continuing until the child’s second birthday. The nurses help mothers improve their 
health and nutrition during pregnancy, learn effective early parenting skills, develop 
healthy family support systems, and reach program goals like completing school and 
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finding employment. The Senatorial Press Release sums up the program’s value in this 
way1:  
Today, NFP operates 150 programs in 22 states and has served more than 69,000 
women and children nationwide. The benefits of the NFP “exceeded costs at a 
society-wide level,” according to a report by the respected non-partisan Brookings 
Institution released in February, 2007. The report found that NFPs on average 
generated savings of $2.88 for every $1 invested, and noted, “At age four, 
children in the Nurse-Family Partnership were living in safer homes and in 
environments that were rated as more conducive to child development.”  
 
Implementation Choices 
Under the current instantiation of the NFP, different states employ different 
implementation strategies. In one strategy, the program is deployed through a top-down 
process by activating current state resources and services. The State of Oklahoma uses 
this type of implementation, which is described on the NFP web site2:  
After searching for an evidence-based model to reduce child abuse and neglect, 
the state of Oklahoma decided to implement the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) 
model utilizing the county health department system. Children First, Oklahoma's 
NFP, was created by state statue in 1996 and funded with state appropriations. In 
February 1997, four pilot sites with 19 nurses were based in Garfield, Garvin, 
Muskogee and Tulsa Counties. By October 1998, services were available in all 77 
counties. Currently the county health department staff consists of 170 public 
health nurses providing home visits, and 22 nurse supervisors. Training, quality 
assurance through site visits and audits, as well as general consultation is 
provided to the Children First nurses by Children First Program Staff out of the 
Oklahoma State Department of Health's central office. Central office staff is 
housed in the Family Support and Prevention Service at OSDH and consists of a 
director, three nurse consultants, an epidemiologist and other administrative staff. 
 
Conversely, the Colorado implementation of NFP is unique in that it uses civic 
collaborations as its site development strategy. To date, in Colorado 16 collaborative 




partnerships are in place, with over 2,800 families in 50 of Colorado’s 64 counties 
enrolled in the NFP (The Colorado Trust, 2001). These collaborative partnerships are 
facilitated by Invest in Kids (IIK), a non-profit organization based in Denver, Colorado 
that partners with communities to implement evidence-based programs targeting children 
(prenatal to age 5), particularly those from low-income families. The NFP was the first 
program that IIK advocated in Colorado. 
IIK uses a four-part process to facilitate the establishment and work of the 16 
collaborative partnerships. As outlined in the official implementation guide for NFP in 
Colorado, this process begins with the creation of a working group comprised of all 
interested health professionals. Rather than assuming the program will be effective in the 
community, stakeholders engage each other to identify community needs and determine 
how well program services meet these needs. This is a critical aspect of the collaboration. 
This working group also assesses whether the human services delivery system in the area 
is capable of delivering the program. This too requires an exploration of the community’s 
capacities, in particular the ways in which programs that offer overlapping services will 
fare once the NFP is implemented. In Colorado the NFP is adopted and implemented by 
stakeholders from a variety of sectors, including county health departments, community 
health agencies, county human services departments, school boards, local head starts, 
county commissioners, and business and civic leaders (Invest in Kids, 2005).  
Early research of the site-development patterns of NFP has shown that the quality 
of the programming outcomes was not uniform across different sites. To understand why, 
researchers at the University of Denver conducted over one hundred interviews with key 
participants of the first stage of program development, including the nurse supervisors 
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from all sixteen sites. They also rated the community processes with a process quality 
rating scale, applied the “Working Together” index of collaboration, developed a forced-
choice instrument to test the differences of experience within the community process, and 
made a conscious effort to transform their qualitative findings into quantifiable results 
(Hicks and Larson, 2003). The key finding was that a high quality process during the first 
part of the collaboration correlated strongly with program outcomes years later (Hicks, et. 
al., submitted 2006). This strong correlation motivates the present research to focus on 
best practice interventions during the first part of the civic collaborations.  
There are three subsequent parts to the civic collaboration design that are helpful 
to present, but not the focus of the current research. The second part of the process 
involves building the long-term community support necessary to secure grant dollars to 
fund the program. This requires broadening the working group beyond immediate health 
care providers to include the full range of professionals needed to ensure a robust client 
load. Moreover, the collaborative partnership must also cultivate a group of citizen 
advocates who can promote the program throughout the community.  
The third part of the process is implementation. The collaborative partnership 
must initially decide the agency that will house and run the program. Given the costs of 
the program and the number of agencies collaborating, this is a difficult process and may 
result in a conflict the partnership will have to mediate. The partnership must also hire 
and train the nursing supervisor and home visitation staff as well as expand the caseload. 
Given the acute nursing shortage, especially in rural parts of the state, this too is an 
extremely difficult and potentially conflict ridden process. 
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Finally, IIK helps collaboratives evolve into a long-term advisory board. An 
advisory board is a community-based support system that ensures program fidelity and 
sustainability, monitors the program’s success, coordinates fundraising efforts and 
advocates the program to state and local decision-makers.  
When civic collaborations have been used, on average they have been found to be 
more successful than the national average on the key measures of program success, see 
Table 1:  
 
Outcome Colorado NFP National NFP Average 
Average visits during 
(pregnancy – infancy – 
toddler) 
10.1 - 20.4 – 16.3 9.5 – 17.5 – 11.7 
Premature infants 7.9% 9.7% 
Low birthweights 8.2% 8.5% 
Initiated breastfeeding 
(infant – 6mo – 12mo) 
84% - 39% - 20% 69% - 29% - 16% 
Reduction in mother 
smoking 
25% 16% 
Table 1 : Comparison of national averages of NFP outcomes when using civic 
collaboration3 
 
The demonstrated results of the use of civic collaborations with NFP extends previous 
findings that community program implementions that use civic collaborations have great 
potential in improving public health and addressing social and economic problems 
(Coutto, 1998).   
                                                
3 State of Colorado Nurse Family Partnerships - Evaluation Report 6 – June 30, 2006 
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 A significant caveat must be noted regarding the success of civic collaborations. 
While the use of civic collaboration for the NFP programs has, on average, been more 
successful than the national average, the use of civic collaboration as an implementation 
choice does not guarantee success. An examination of the individual communities that 
used civic collaborations to implement NFP show a wide variety of results even when 
implementing the same program using the same implementation strategy. Some NFP 
civic collaborations failed to get off the ground, some struggled to perform for years until 
a decision was made to end the program, and some performed exceptionally well.  
To realize the potential of civic collaboration, we need to understand the practices 
that are essential to the program success, which I refer to here as “best practices.” The 
objective of this study is to identify, formalize, and gain insights into the best practices of 
civic collaboration. The research program of this study includes four steps. First, we 
investigate field observations from the 16 community implementations of NFP in 
Colorado to identify practices that are associated with favorable program outcomes. 
Second, we borrow theories from economics, specifically game theory, to formalize the 
practices. Third, we ground, calibrate, and validate an agent-based model to implement 
the theoretical framework. Fourth and finally, we conduct experiments in the agent-based 
model to gain insights into the relative effect of and interactions between the best 
practices. 
Step 1: Identifying best practices from field observation 
We investigated field observations from the initial stages of the collaboration in 16 
communities that implemented the NFP programs. First we identified an intervention 
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evident in all of the communities observed and unique when compared to other 
implementations of NFP across the nation, namely:  
• A snowball growth process starting with a small initial working group 
We then identified two interventions that are associated with more favorable program 
outcomes when using the snowball growth process. Two interventions we identified in 
the current research that seemed to distinguish high-performing from low-performing 
civic partnerships are: 
• A deliberative planning process 
• The thoughtful inclusion of new people into the working group 
These distinguishing factors were identified by analyzing supporting data, including:  
• Interviews with the directors of IIK who were involved in the development of all 
sixteen communities 
• Narrative descriptions of each community implementation in Colorado NFP 
initiatives, provided by the directors of IIK 
• The official implementation guide for NFP in Colorado 
• Program outcomes (average visits, birth weights, premature infants, attrition of 
participants, …) from data entered into the Clinical Information System, a system 
that is used as a foundation for the continuous quality improvement of program 
operations and outcomes nationwide 
Intervention one: Building a small initial working group with snowball growth  
The first part of the four part process to facilitate the establishment and work of the 16 
collaborative partnerships begins with the creation of a working group comprised of all 
interested health professionals. Participants come from different sectors of the 
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community and include individuals, government agencies, churches and civic 
organizations. In the NFP program specifically, the makeup of participants vary, and can 
include health department doctors, human services department directors, public health 
nurses, elected officials, existing nurse home visitation programs, other youth agencies, 
other health providers, city officials, law enforcement officers, judicial officers, and 
business leaders (Invest in Kids, 2005).  
The selection process is unique for each community. From the interviews of the 
program directors:  
Interviewer: How did you initially select who was to be part of the 
collaboration? 
 
Executive director of IIK: The way we initially target the people was 
different in every community. We would typically have one contact that 
would put us in touch with someone else and they would pull in someone 
else. In some communities we would cold call the director of the health 
department and invite them to lunch and tell them about the program. 
Then we had to defer to the local folks to see who else should be at the 
table, but we had to push them to see who else needs to come. We had to 
let them pick because we do not know the community. They are the ones 
who know who are key people in the community. We have targets. We can 
say we want the Director of Human Services, Head Start, the school 
people, health department, or elected officials, but it was hit or miss 
whether we got a judge, a probation officer, or a district attorney. 
Sometimes we got them, but only if others looped them in.  
 
Interviewer: Did you ever object to anyone? 
 
Executive Director of IIK: Never 
 
The working group conducts a community needs assessment to determine how well the 
program services meet the community’s particular needs. This is a critical aspect of the 
collaboration, and it is not taken for granted that the program fits the community. Some 
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communities never progressed from the planning stage, and the program was not 
implemented in these communities.  
Intervention two: Deliberative planning process 
In a study submitted to Prevention Science (Hicks, Larson, Nelson, Olds, & Johnston, 
submitted 2006), we hypothesized that the process quality of building collaborative 
partnerships would account for a significant proportion of the variance in attrition beyond 
that accounted for by the characteristics of individual participants. The attrition rate of 
participants is an immediate indicator of program success (Olds, 2003). We were seeking 
to discover whether certain qualities manifested in community collaboration processes 
significantly improve the success of the program. The most striking aspect of the results 
is not simply that the hypothesis is supported but rather the strength of the association 
between process quality and attrition.  
In practical terms the correlation between process quality and program outcomes 
suggests that collaborative partnerships that devote sufficient upfront time and energy to 
improving the quality of the process employed, as well as the capacity of individuals to 
enhance those processes, are likely to be more successful, at least with respect to 
reducing the attrition among the individuals these programs served. One additional fact 
makes this finding even more surprising: site level data on process quality were collected 
approximately four years before the programmatic data on attrition were collected. That 
is, the process quality data were gathered from the interviews and scaled responses of 
community stakeholders who were at that time involved in bringing the NFP program to 
their community and developing a collaborative partnership to achieve this result. Four 
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years later when the program had been implemented, the attrition data were summarized 
for each of the programs.  
One distinguishing feature of more successful collaborative partnerships was the 
freedom to develop according to their own schedule. A result of developing at a natural 
pace instead of being driven by external timetables allowed them to engage in a 
deliberative process, even if that deliberation slowed down the process. At least two 
community implementations were delayed to make sure that everyone in the working 
group was coordinated toward the same goals.  
According to the Deputy Director, the ability to grow slowly was necessary:  
Deputy Director of IIK: One community in particular was a very political 
community. You have to navigate it carefully otherwise you will get hosed. So I 
think that it would not have been possible to go any quicker and result in a 
successful program. 
 
The Program Director also compared the process of developing the same program 
in two different communities, one with a highly deliberative process and another in which 
a lack of deliberation was observed during the planning process.  
Deputy Director of IIK: We had a great group in (community one) who was 
committed and thoughtful. It was scarier when you went into a community like 
(community two) and they were like boom, we are ready, lets go. And you know 
that that is not the right thing to do, but you can’t really force them to slow 
down. And in (community one) it was really a thoughtful approach. It was slow, 
but it wasn’t painful in any way.  
 
Some of the communities paid “lip-service” in order to progress to the next stages of the 
program. These programs did not perform as well in the long term as those observed as 
having a deliberative planning process. Although placing artificial time limits on each 
stages of the process might be tempting, such external pressures have limited success, as 
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artificial time constraints negatively influence the rate and quality of later work (Kelly 
et.al., 1990). 
Intervention three: Thoughtful inclusion of new people 
Early experience, the degree of interaction, and the ways in which people join 
existing communities make a difference how well participants performed learning the 
norms of the community (Lampe & Johnston, 2005). If the early stakeholders in the 
group devoted their energies to competing for resources, building their back-home 
agencies, expanding spheres of influence, or pursuing individual agendas, the quality of 
the process would have suffered and the subsequent lack of confidence in that process 
would have affected new participants, ultimately decreasing their willingness to commit 
time and energy to implementing the decisions of this early stakeholder group (Hicks, et 
al., submitted 2006). Theories of organizational learning suggest that learning how to 
perform in groups often takes place through legitimate peripheral participation in 
communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  
When asked how new people were included in the high-performing compared to 
low-performing NFP communities, the Executive Director of the program responded:  
 
Executive Director of IIK: There are a lot of stories about how we have 
engaged additional people. We just did an orientation last week and we walked 
through a history of the program and it was a really thoughtful orientation. 
Other places were like – hi, I am so and so and I am replacing so and so.  
 
Interviewer: Did you notice a difference in performance between those 
different styles of including new participants?  
 
Executive Director of IIK: Oh sure – one of the key things that we have seen 
was if the implementing agencies continue successfully the agency engaged in 
substantive discussion. When it is only information sharing with just updates 
then it is hit or miss if people are choosing to attend. If there is thoughtful and 
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productive discussion, I think that at the end of the day is where there are the 
ones that are the most successful. 
 
The same relationship holds for those communities that were not able to foster a credible 
and open process. When people are invited to participate in collaborative activities they 
must make a quick, often intuitive, judgment as to the likelihood that they will be 
exploited, rejected, or isolated by the others (Tyler & Lind 1992). Even though 
coordinating toward a common goal might provide significant advantages over self-
oriented goals, a judgment that investing in the group goals will lead to a relatively high 
likelihood of exploitation, rejection, or isolation will lead people to pursue self-oriented 
lower-risk, lower-reward goals (Tyler & Lind, 2001).  
Step 2: Theoretical Development: 
For the second step of our research, we borrow theories from economics, specifically 
game theory, to formalize the best practices we observed in the field.  
Game theory 
Game theory has a history of being used for theory construction and to provide insight 
into the dynamics of a system. In game theory, multiple players make individual 
decisions based on a pre-established payoff structure to achieve the best personal 
outcome. Game theory and repeated games provide a formal modeling approach for 
social situations where individuals interact with others. Repeated game play has been 
used to explore the emergence of complex group behavior by observing the interactions 
between individuals (Schelling, 1978; Holland, 1998), testing novel configurations in 
game theoretic experiments (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Ostam, 2000), rationalizing the 
 14 
potential of organizational structures to self-organize in real world settings (Lansing, 
1991; Holland 1995), justifying new structures of information exchange (Axelrod, 2001), 
and exploring the development of common practices in policy development (Skryms, 
1996). We use game theory so we can study the role of interventions during the growth 
process by naming the participants and available actions, formalizing the problem, and 
extending the rich experimental economics literature that studies coordination challenges 
in groups (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; 
Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudri et al., 2001; Weber, 2007). 
Choosing the appropriate game 
To meet our research objectives, we must choose the game that best represents the nature 
of the collaboration we see in the field, isolate the central conflicts and interactions 
challenge, and then find the proper theoretical framework to examine the outcomes that 
develop from the interactions of individual participants. We must then contextualize the 
three best practice interventions within this framework. 
Commonly used group games in the literature vary based on the type of 
coordination and the features of the game established by the payoff structure. There are 
three common notions for coordination. The first notion is from the prisoner’s dilemma 
or social goods game in which individuals can either cooperate or defect; if we fail to 
coordinate, then someone benefits at someone else’s expense (Axlerod, 1984). The 
second notion is pure coordination where if we fail to coordinate everyone loses; this is 
very different than someone gaining an advantage. For instance, failing to drive on the 
correct side of the street is in no one’s best interest. There is a third notion of cooperation 
in which a group of people contribute diverse skills, abilities, and information to 
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potentially achieve a super-additive outcome; we will do better than if we were all 
isolationists. While all three of these aspects of coordination are in play within the 
working groups of NFP to different extents, this paper focuses on the third because in the 
communities in Colorado we observed people come together with different resources, 
skills, and contacts and when they coordinated successfully, the collaborations they 
created out-performed the national averages.  
Three games that test these aspects of coordination are commonly referred to as 
social goods games4, pure coordination games, and minimum-effort games and are 
characterized by the dilemmas individual participants face when playing the game, the 
presence or absence of a risk-dominated strategy, and the presence or absence of an 
incentive to deviate, see Table 2.  
Game Social Goods  Pure Coordination Minimum Effort 
Dilemma Sacrifice personal 





security vs. group 
efficiency 
Incentive to deviate Yes No No 
Risk-dominated 
strategy 
Yes No Yes 
Example Paying Taxes, 
Leaving feedback 
on Ebay 
Coin Flip, Wearing 




Table 2: Comparison of characteristics of different games 
Social goods game 
A social goods game, also called a public goods game, is characterized by individuals 
facing the option to contribute personal resources (time, money, energy) toward a project 
that will benefit the group more than the direct return will benefit the individual (Katz 
                                                
4 A Prisoners dilemma game is a common form of two player social goods game 
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and Shapiro, 1985; Ostam, 2000). This game is usually played in the lab by giving a 
group of individuals a personal fund, for instance $5. Individuals then choose to 
contribute any amount of their personal fund to the general fund. All money that is 
contributed to the general fund is then doubled and then equally redistributed to all 
people playing the game. So in a game with four people, for every $1 contributed, you 
will only receive a personal return of $.50 (=$2.00/4). However, the individual also earns 
money based on what others contribute to the general fund. So the best group level 
outcome is if everyone contributes his or her entire $5, for a total of $20, which would 
then be doubled to $40 and redistributed equally, wherein each person would receive $10. 
However, there is an incentive to deviate. The best individual outcome would result from 
donating nothing and having everyone else contribute their entire $5, to total $15. This 
$15 would then be doubled to $30 and be redistributed equally, so that each person 
receives $7.50. By not contributing any money, the person who deviated from the group 
outcome by being selfish would earn $7.50 on top of his or her original $5 for a final total 
of $12.50. Examples of this best economic outcome in the real world occur when people 
do not pay their taxes, ignore water restrictions (Schelling, 1978), or fail to contribute 
feedback to eBay (Gazzale, working paper).  
Pure coordination game 
The basic form of a coordination game, usually called a pure coordination game, is 
characterized by complete symmetry between players, between strategies, and between 
equilibria (Mehta et al., 1994). A classic example of pure coordination game is the game 
of “Heads and Tails” from Schelling’s seminal work (1960). In this game, multiple 
players write down either “heads” or “tails.” If they simultaneously write down the same 
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word, each is paid some given amount of money. If they write down different words, they 
receive nothing. In this pure coordination game, players have the same payoff structure, 
the same strategies (“heads” or “tails”) and the same expected value if either “heads” or 
“tails” becomes their unanimous choice. In the real world there is no benefit in being the 
only individual driving on the wrong side of the road, or being the only person not 
wearing the same color shirt as the rest of the fans at the basketball playoff games.  
Minimum-effort game 
The pure coordination game has been refined in several ways to represent more complex 
situations. One family of refined coordination games is referred to as minimum-effort 
games (Skryms, 1996, 2004; Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and 
Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; and Chaudri et al., 2001). In a minimum-
effort game, players have to invest some effort to achieve a potential payoff, but the 
actual payoff to all players is tied to the effort of the person who contributes the least. 
Individuals participating in the minimum-effort game are faced with the dilemma of 
protecting their personal resources or investing their resources toward a group goal that 
will improve the welfare of everyone involved, while facing the risk that others might not 
contribute and their investment will be lost.  
A simple example of a chain-building exercise can help clarify the nature and 
dilemmas inherent in the minimum-effort game. In the chain-building example a group of 
people have the task of building a linked chain that will be used to earn money for the 
group. Each person in the group is responsible for building one link of the chain. To do 
so, each person can choose to spend either $1 of their own money and build a weak link 
or $10 of their own money and build a strong link, see Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Costs to build a strong or weak link 
After each person has independently decided to build a strong or a weak link the 
links are joined into a chain and the strength of the chain is tested. The chain is only as 
strong as the weakest link, so that a chain is weak even if only one weak link is present; 
the exact number of weak links in the chain does not matter. Each member in the group 
will earn $5 if the chain is weak. If the chain is strong and made of entirely strong links; 
each member will earn $30. A person choosing to make a weak link will earn $4 
regardless of the choices the others make. A person who chooses to makes a strong link 
might either lose $5 or earn $20 depending on the links the others choose to build. The 
chain-building example demonstrates the dilemma each individual of a group faces when 
deciding between personal resource security and group efficiency.  
In this example of a minimum-effort game, when the players all coordinate to 
build the same type of link, the outcome is a game of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. A 
“pure-strategy Nash equilibrium” exists when no player gains anything by being the only 
person to make a choice different than the rest of the group. When everyone makes the 
same type of link, the choice is sustainable as long as no new participants are added. The 
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preference of outcomes between a strong-chain equilibrium and a weak-chain equilibrium 
are orderable because the game has different payoffs for different strength chains. The 
Pareto-optimal outcome is for everyone to make the strongest links. A “Pareto-optimal” 
outcome is a combination of choices in which it would not be possible to improve the 
well being of one participant without making the other participants worse off. However, 
strategic uncertainty exists because a player is unsure of the strategies others may choose. 
As the number of players increases the probability of someone building a weak link also 
increases. As the risk of someone creating a weak link increases, the probability increases 
that even people who would build a strong link in a lower risk environment might decide 
to build a weak link instead. With so many sources of risk and uncertainty about what 
others will choose, and thus which choice is the best choice, the only certain option is to 
build a weak link. Thus, as the uncertainty of others’ actions increases, the difficulty of 
making a strong chain also increases.  
Collaborative partnerships as minimum-effort games 
Compared with more traditional teams, civic collaborations are unique in that when they 
are successful, the actions of individual actors come together in a decentralized yet 
coordinated action. In civic collaborations, the participants normally have more choice 
over which programs to join (Roussos & Fawcett, 2000; Johnston & Hicks, 2004; 
Malone, 2004). In collaborative partnerships the dilemma of the chain-game occurs when 
individual participants choose between using their resources to further the goals of the 
collaborative partnership or to protect their personal resources (Hicks & Larson, 2003). 
Thus a major obstacle in creating an effective collaborative partnership is coordinating 
the action of all the participants toward the group goals.  
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As previously mentioned, when people are invited to participate in collaborative 
activities they must make a quick, often intuitive, judgment as to the likelihood that they 
will be exploited, rejected, or isolated by the others (Tyler & Lind 1992). Even though 
coordinating toward a common goal might provide significant advantages over pursuing 
self-oriented goals, a judgment that investing in group goals will lead to a relatively high 
likelihood of exploitation, rejection, or isolation will lead people to pursue self-oriented 
lower risk, lower reward goals (Tyler & Lind 2001). Directly evident in the successful 
civic partnerships observed in Colorado was the willingness for stakeholders to risk their 
own interests while focusing on broader and often more difficult to reach goals. The 
minimum-effort game captures many of the characteristics that occur when stakeholders 
have a choice in how to coordinate their efforts in collaborative partnerships.  
Step 3: Agent-based Modeling 
The unique characteristics and the empirical strength of agent-based modeling make it an 
appropriate method by which to study interventions in the growth process of civic 
collaboration. We use observations from the field and a previous laboratory experiment 
as empirical benchmarks for the development of the agent-based model. Within the 
agent-based model, computer-simulated agents serve as experimental “subjects” whose 
behaviors are controlled by specific behavioral rules. Interactions among agents could 
induce social structures, group level behaviors, and differences in performance outcomes. 
Individual choices are formalized as strategic behaviors in a game-theoretic minimum-
effort game (Skryms 1996, 2004; Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez 
and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; and Chaudri et al., 2001). The model 
serves as an artificial collaboration environment where we can easily manipulate different 
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parameters, visualize individual and combined effects during the growth process, and 
eliminate confounding influences that would be unavoidable in the real world. By 
manipulating the size of the initial group, the growth rate of the simulated civic 
collaboration program, and the ways in which new members are included into the group, 
we can infer their respective effect on success of the program. 
Understanding the growth process in natural groups is particularly difficult for 
many reasons. Much of the empirical foundation of group theory comes from studying a 
specific type of ad hoc group in a laboratory with no history and a very limited future. 
The membership of the group is normally assigned, and the experimenter controls the 
simple tasks they perform. Laboratory groups exist independent of context and are not 
embedded in any larger social units (McGrath, 1991). However, when studying groups in 
their natural settings, it is difficult to experiment with various conditions, observe enough 
critical variations to draw conclusions about causality, and avoid influencing the 
interaction of the groups while observing them. These specific limitations have been 
reported with the previous research on the NFP civic collaboration in Colorado (Hicks, et 
al, Submitted).  
To address the difficulties with individual research methods we have adopted a 
variation of the three-part research strategy proposed by Arrow, et al. (2000) that 
combines a theoretical framework, empirical studies, and agent-based modeling. A multi-
method approach is necessary to understand and explore multiple aspects of the problem, 
see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Multi-method research agenda 
 
Agent-based modeling can be used to test separate hypotheses and generate 
explanations of complex group behavior. Understanding the dynamics, history, and 
relations between agents in an environment can complement field studies and may be a 
more satisfying explanation of behavior observed in the environment (Lansing, 1993). 
Compared with traditional social science paradigms, such as statistical estimating and 
differential equations, agent-based modeling has five unique characteristics. First, it takes 
a bottom-up approach. Rather than seeking a centralized control mechanism for orderly 
behaviors of a system, agent-based modeling explores whether decentralized interactions 
among autonomous actors can lead to system-level regularities (Holland, 1995; 1998). 
Second, an agent-based framework assumes adaptive rather than fully rational behaviors 
of actors (Axelrod, 1997). Actors with limited information and foresight adopt strategies 
through interacting with others. Third, an agent-based model allows heterogeneity among 
actors, whereas traditional social scientists often suppress agent heterogeneity in order to 
make their models tractable (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Fourth, agent-based modeling 
focuses on dynamic processes that produce or disrupt equilibria rather than the static 
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nature of equilibria (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Last, traditional statistical or multi-equation 
modeling assumes linear, deterministic or predictive relationships among parameters, 
whereas an agent-based framework explicitly takes account of nonlinear, 
nondeterministic, or recursive interactions among multiple levels of actors.  
Another advantage of agent-based modeling is that the model does not try to 
explain everything about the phenomenon of interest; simplicity is its strength. The 
model also avoids attempting to replicate the real world exactly. A model can show that 
something that has previously been explained in a complex manner might in fact be the 
result of a simpler explanation (Axelrod, 2003). Instead of looking for correlations 
between characteristics and outcomes, agent-based models allow for the investigation of 
an entire process. They can also be used to isolate competing hypothesis because of the 
ability to control completely the experimental environment difficult to obtain in natural 
settings (Lansing, 1991; Nan, et al. 2005). Agent-based models gain strength as a 
research method when they are part of a larger research program (Arrow, 2000). In this 
case an agent-based model is being grounded by a field study, then calibrated and 
validated with previous experimental findings.  
Overview of remaining work 
For the next two chapters of the dissertation, I will use agent-based modeling to test the 
individual and combined effects of the interventions that we believe are indicative of a 
high quality civic collaboration.  
 In chapter two, I begin by creating a baseline model similar to experiments that 
have studied minimum-effort games in the lab (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and 
Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; and Chaudri et al., 
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2001). The model is designed to be as simple as possible, and any variables in the model 
will be calibrated based on results from the previous seventeen years of laboratory 
experiments of different size groups playing minimum-effort games. I also created a 
parallel mathematical model that serves to perform an internal validation check of the 
fidelity of the model. After the baseline model is calibrated and validated, I test the first 
intervention that we observed in all of the NFP civic collaborations in Colorado, 
specifically:  
• Snowball growth process starting with a small initial group 
This intervention starts with small groups playing the minimum-effort game, and then 
steadily increasing the number of people playing the game. This intervention will be 
validated with a similar study that focused on the growth of group size in a laboratory 
experiment, which found that managing the growth process was one way to increase the 
success of groups playing a minimum-effort game (Weber, 2006). 
 In chapter three, I will use agent-based modeling to understand the qualities of the 
growth process that differentiated the successful from the less successful civic 
collaborations in the NFP implementations in Colorado. To do so, I will expand on the 
baseline model by adding two interventions, specifically:  
• Deliberative planning process 
• Thoughtful inclusion of new people 
Both of these interventions can be modeled individually or together in the agent-based 
model.  
For the deliberate planning process, we found that the more successful groups did 
not rush the initial planning process, took whatever time was necessary to reach a 
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consensus before growing, and took time to allow for the participation of everyone 
involved. The less successful groups focused more on meeting internal deadlines, 
progressing through the development stages quickly, and brought too many people into 
the group too quickly. To model this intervention we vary the rate of adding new 
participants. In the model, when the rate is lower, the participants play in multiple rounds 
of the game with the same number of participants before adding any new participants.  
 For the thoughtful inclusion of new people, we found that in the more successful 
communities, time was taken not simply to slowly include new members, but to gradually 
involve them into the activities of the group. In the less successful groups, new members 
were frequently thrust into participating in the group without knowing the history of the 
group. To model this intervention we have new members playing the game by interacting 
with only a subset of the existing population. As they continue to form part of the group, 
the number of participants they play with gradually increases. 
 The two growth interventions (deliberative planning, and gradual inclusion into 
the game) are analyzed in isolation and also in combination with the other interventions 
during growth, in order to isolate the individual and combined effects of each, see Table 
3.  
Intervention In field In Model 
Growth starting with a 
small initial group 
Snowball inclusion of new 
participants during the 
growth of the working 
group 
Start with 2 players, play 
round, add player, play 
round, repeat.  
Deliberative planning  Time taken to deliberate 
resulting in slower 
progression through first 
phase of collaboration  
Repeated play at the same 
size group 
Gradual inclusion of new 
participants 
Thoughtful inclusion of 
new people by sharing 
history and slowly 
When a new player joins 
the game, they play with 
only one other player. For 
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increasing their role of 
participation 
each round, they play with 
an additional player 





Baseline Agent-based Model 
 
…models that aim to explore fundamental processes should be judged by their 
fruitfulness, not by their accuracy. For this purpose, realistic representation of many 
details is unnecessary and even counterproductive. 
 
    -Robert Axelrod, the Complexity of Cooperation (p.6) 
Introduction 
This chapter has four goals: 
1. Introduce a baseline agent-based model of agents playing a minimum-
effort chain building game.  
2. Given the existing literature from previous laboratory experiments of 
different size groups playing minimum-effort games, calibrate the model 
based at the parameter and process level. 
3. Add the growth intervention to the model and test whether growth enables 
coordination in larger groups than a no-growth condition. 
4. Verify the growth intervention with a laboratory finding that used a 
similar intervention (Weber, 2006).  
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The agent-based model is used to recreate the dynamics of a controlled 
experimental environment. Agent-based models can be described by defining their 
agents, environment, rules and interactions, and measurements. For the remainder of this 
dissertation there will be four versions of the model: 
1. Baseline model 
2. Intervention 1: Growth 
3. Intervention 2: Deliberate planning / Slow Growth (in Chapter 3) 
4. Intervention 3: Gradual inclusion / Small Chains (in Chapter 3) 
Each subsequent version will extend the previous model by adding characteristics or 
features to the agents, environment, rules and interactions, and/or measurements.  
Baseline model 
The following description explains the baseline model created using NetLogo (Wilensky, 
1999). In all versions of the model, the agents will play multiple rounds of the chain 
building game with other agents. In each round, each agent will independently choose to 
build either a strong or weak link. After each of the agents has chosen whether to build a 
strong or weak link, they will receive a payoff based upon their choices and the collective 
actions others chose, see Table 4.  
The collective choices of other players  
All strong links One or more weak links 
Strong link Strong-chain-payoff Sucker-payoff Individual 
player’s choice Weak link Weak-chain-payoff Weak-chain-payoff 
Table 4: Payoff table of minimum-effort chain game 
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Agents 
There are two types of agents in the model, players and links.  
Players 
Players are created with one attribute, their generic attitude toward other players (see 
Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: A typical player 
This level is a value from 0 – 1. Generic-attitude * 100 represents the percent likelihood 
they think a player they have no other information about would build a strong link. The 
generic-attitude for each agent is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a 
mean determined by the environmental variable average-attitudes and a standard 
deviation of .2. If the result of the random draw is greater than 1 or less than 0, then 
generic-attitude is set to 1 or 0 respectively for that player.  
Two observations justify the use of a generic-attitude variable to estimate others 
behaviors.  First, according to the economics literature on coordination games, the main 
issue in coordination results from a player’s uncertainty over what others will do 
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(Crawford, 1995; Weber, 2005).  The generic-attitude variable reflects this uncertainty.  
Second, based on field observation, the level of participations of stakeholders in the NFP 
collaborations in Colorado was based in part on the attitudes they had towards others and 
toward the overall process (Hicks, et al., submitted 2006). 
Links 
The second type of agent in the model, links, represents and maintains the attitude one 
player currently has toward another player. Each player maintains a relation to each of 
the other players in the model by individual directed links. The links are initialized based 
on the generic-attitude of the player from which they emanate. Figure 4 shows links 
emanating from player 0 toward both players 1 and 2. Not shown in the figure are the 
links that players one and two have toward each other and toward player 0. 
 
Figure 4: A player and the attitudes held toward other players stored in links 
As the game is played, the attitude held in each link is updated.  
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Environment 
The environment for the baseline model consists of six variables: group-size, average-
attitudes, participation-update, strong-chain-payoff, weak-chain-payoff, and sucker-
payoff.  
Group-size 
The group-size variable is the independent variable in the baseline model experiment. 
Group-size is set between 2-12 to represent how many players are participating in the 
experiment.  
Average-attitudes 
The average-attitudes variable is the mean of the normal distribution that a player’s 
generic-attitude is drawn from. The average-attitudes value can be set from 0 to 1. 
Higher levels of this value represent a population that, on average, will believe that other 
players are more likely to build strong chains. For the baseline model, this value was 
calibrated at 0.755.  
Participation-update 
The participation-update variable is a model setting and it is applied to all links to 
calculate to what degree a players will change their attitudes of other players’ next 
actions based on the outcome of the current round. This variable can be set from 0 to 1. A 
value of 0 represents that no change in attitude will be made. A value of 1 will change a 
links attitude to either 0 or 1 based on the outcome of round.  
Payoffs 
                                                
5 Other values for average-attitudes tested were 0.50, 0.90, & 0.95. The use of a value of 0.75 is justified in 
the model calibration section.  
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The payoffs for the minimum-effort game follow the form that the strong-chain payoff is 
higher than the weak-chain-payoff, which in turn is higher than the sucker payoff 
(Skryms, 2004). The specific values of each payoff were set according to the payoffs 
used in the minimum-effort game in agent-based model used in Johnston (2006), see 
Table 5. 
The collective choices of other players  
All strong links One or more weak links 
Strong link Strong-chain-payoff (8) Sucker-payoff (0) Individual 
player’s choice Weak link Weak-chain-payoff (3) Weak-chain-payoff (3) 
Table 5: Agent-based model payoff table 
Interactions / rules 
This section details how the model represents the experiment, from the setup through the 
steps of each round.   
Setup 
The model creates a group of agents equal to the group-size variable. For example, Figure 
5 shows a sample initial set up an experiment with a group-size of 3 and average-
attitudes 0.75.  
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Figure 5: A generic setup of group-size 3 
Each agent has a generic-attitude drawn from a normal distribution based on the average-
attitudes variable. The player’s individual attitudes toward other players are stored in the 
links emanating from them. 
 
Figure 6: Screen-capture after setup with group-size 12 
See Figure 6 for a screenshot of the setup of the baseline model with group-size 12.  
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Playing a round 
A round consists of each player making a choice to build a strong or weak link, receiving 
a payoff based on their choices and the group outcome, and then updating their attitudes 
of the other players based upon the group outcome.  
 The first step of each round has every player choose to build a strong link or a weak 
link. To make this choice each player independently calculates the expected value of 
choosing to build a strong link based upon their current estimate of attitudes of the other 
players in the room. Specifically, they use the following calculation: 
Expected value of a strong-link choice = my-attitude-toward-player 1 * my-
attitude-toward-player 2 * … my-attitude-toward-player-n * strong-chain-
payoff 
 
A player will choose a strategy based upon the highest expected value of all available 
strategies (Winter & Szulanski, 2001).  If the calculated expected value of a strong-link 
choice is greater than the weak-chain-payoff, then the player will choose to build a strong 
link. If the calculated expected value of a strong-link payoff is less than the weak-chain-
payoff, then the player will choose to build a weak link. There is no need to calculate an 
expected value for a weak-link choice because the payoff of choosing to build a weak 
link is always the weak-chain payoff, regardless of what others choose. In the model, 
agents who build a strong link are shown in blue, and those who build a weak link are 
shown in red, see Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: First round choices based on a comparison of the expected value of a 
strong link choice and the weak-chain payoff of three 
 
The final step of each round is for each of the players to update their attitudes toward the 
other players based upon the group outcome. The group outcome is used to simulate the 
same information present in the laboratory experiments, wherein at the end of each round 
the experimenter would announce only the minimum choice of the participants without 
revealing players’ individual choices6. If the group-outcome was a weak chain, each 
attitude would be updated using the participation-update variable according to the 
following calculation: 
                                                
6 While in small-size games it might be possible to deduce the specific actions of the other players, that 
dynamic was not replicated in the model.  
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 updated-attitude = current-attitude – (current-attitude * participation-update)  
If the group-outcome was a strong chain, each attitude would be updated using the 
participation-update variable according to the following calculation: 
 updated-attitude = current-attitude + ((1 – current-attitude) * participation-update)  
For example, if the three agents in the figure played one round, then two players would 
choose to build a strong link and one player would choose to build a weak link. The 
outcome would be a weak chain, due to the presences of one or more weak links; the 
weak link player would receive the weak-chain payoff, and the strong link players would 
both receive the sucker payoff. Afterward, they would update their attitudes using the 
first equation with a participation-update variable of 0.75. Figure 8 shows the updated 
attitudes, and the expected values and choices for round 2. 
 
Figure 8: Round 2 choices, attitudes, and expected value for strong-link choice. All 
expected values are less than the weak-chain payoff of three, so all players choose to 
build a weak link (red players).  
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The model then runs another round in which the agents each make a choice, receive a 
payoff, and update their attitudes of other players. In the baseline model, each experiment 
is run for 12 rounds.   
Measurements 
The dependent variable in the baseline model is the group outcome of the final round of 
the experiment. The example shown in figures 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 would be a weak-chain 
outcome.  
Model Validation 
There are significant limitations to using agent-based models as a research tool. While 
such models may be closely controlled, results derived in artificial situations do not 
always extend well to more naturalistic settings. One common complaint is that 
simplifying the model significantly decreases the credibility and applicability of the 
resulting findings. Agent-based models also normally face greater challenges of 
validation than more mature methods of scientific research (Axelrod, 2003). However, 
these challenges can be overcome by creating a deliberate plan for validation at the onset 
of the modeling project. Validation is neither a simple nor clearly defined topic 
(Johnston, 2005). To validate our agent-based model we employ three validation 
processes proposed by Carley (1996): grounding, calibrating, and verifying.  
Grounding 
Grounding establishes the reasonableness of the model, showing that simplifications 
made from the real world do not trivialize the model and that other researches have 
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successfully made similar assumptions to capture the key elements of the theory. The 
grounding of the model was largely addressed in chapter one in the discussion of game 
theory and why, in particular, the minimum-effort coordination game most closely 
represents the collaborative partnerships in Colorado.  
Calibrating 
Calibrating the model is an iterative process of modifying its variables to fit the real data 
that is available. In this dissertation we calibrate the average-attitudes and update-
participation variables of the baseline model by the comparing model outcomes of 
different size groups which have different variable settings to the experiments of different 
size groups playing the minimum-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and 
Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; and Chaudri et al., 
2001; Weber, 2006).  
Verifying 
Verifying the model is the process of demonstrating that it matches the real world in 
some capacity. During verification, unlike the calibration phase, the variables in the 
model are not altered. In this dissertation we verify that the growth intervention of the 
model matches the recent findings from Weber (2006), where both his experimental 
findings and the model in this dissertation show that the mechanism of growing a group 
from a small to a large group size can result in the coordination of groups of size twelve.  
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Model Calibration 
Calibration occurs at both the process and parameter levels. For the process calibration, 
the overall design of the experiment in the model, up to twelve people playing a repeated 
minimum-effort game, was motivated by the design of laboratory studies (Van Huyck et 
al., 1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 
1996; and Chaudri et al., 2001; Weber, 2006).   
For parameter level validation, the design of the model requires setting the 
average-attitudes and participation-update variables to specific values for the 
experiment. Although different settings of these variables do have an effect on the model 
outcome, this dissertation does not study how different baseline attitudes or different 
reaction rates to behaviors effect program outcomes. To test the interventions of interest 
(growth from a small group, slow growth, and small-chains), the variables average-
attitudes and participation-update need to be calibrated to settings that produce a set of 
expect results in the baseline model and to be left at that level for the remainder of the 
model development.  
To calibrate reasonable values for average-attitudes and participation-update 
variables, the model was run 1000 times for each of the 16 different combinations of four 
different average-attitudes values [0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95] and four different values of 
participation-update values [0.2, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9] over different group-sizes [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 12] for a total of 176,000 runs. The results were then compared to findings 
taken from the last seventeen years of experimental research into coordination within 
different size groups in minimum-effort games.  
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Studies of group coordination problems in the lab show that as the size of the 
group increases its ability to coordinate the actions of those individuals involved sharply 
decreases (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and Knex, 2000; Weber 2006). The 
experimental difficulty of making “strong chains” has been the focus of research for 
some time7. In a series of laboratory studies from 1990 to 2006, coordinating any group 
larger than 6 members within the lab was nearly impossible (Van Huyck et al., 1990; 
Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudri 
et al., 2001; Weber, 2006). These findings are summarized in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Maximum strength chain based on group size 
In these studies the subjects participated in a 7-action minimum-effort game. To 
compare it with the chain-building example, the players build a chain by choosing 
between seven different strengths of chain links, and the payoff to the group is based on 
                                                
7 While the experiments do not use the chain-building analogy, the structure of the minimum-effort game 
that was used is identical to that of building chains with different strengths. For the sake of consistency, 
throughout this dissertation I will describe the experiment as if the experiment is a chain-building game. 
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the weakest link. Also demonstrated in Figure 9, when a group is comprised of only two 
members, eighty-six percent of the time both participants coordinated to the strongest-
chain equilibrium. Even the addition of one extra person drops the ability to coordinate in 
the strongest-chain equilibrium to eighteen percent. Six people were unable to coordinate 
any higher than the third worst outcome, and that was only ten percent of the time. 
Finally, groups of eight or more always coordinated on the risk dominated equilibrium. A 
“risk-dominated equilibrium” is a strategy in which the participants choose to maximize 
their outcome regardless of what choices the others make. In this case the risk-dominated 
strategy is to build the weakest link.  
In the laboratory studies, the minimum-effort game was played with seven 
different possible choices. To account for difference in the baseline model with only two 
choices, I perform the data transformation of treating any non-risk dominated outcome as 
a weak-chain outcome. To calibrate the model I compared the results in the literature 
with the results of the 16 possible configurations of variables on the basis of three 
criteria: value validation, point validation, and pattern validation (Carley, 1996). 
1. Percent of non-risk-dominated outcomes of two player games (value 
validation) 
2. Size above which participants could not coordinate and reach a non-risk 
dominated outcome (point validation) 
3. Same general pattern of results as size increases (pattern validation) 
Based on these criteria, of the 16 possible configurations of variables, the setting the 
average-attitude variable to 0.75 and the participation-update to 0.75 produced the best 
fit, see Figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Comparison of literature results and model results with settings (average-
attitudes - 0.75) and (participation-update - 0.75)8 
Applying the three criteria, we claim value validation because at group size 2, the 93.8% 
of model outcomes were not the risk-dominated outcome, and in the laboratory, across 
six studies and 37 groups of size 2, 95% of outcomes were not the risk-dominated 
outcome. We claim point validation, because in both the laboratory experiments and the 
model, some trials were able to coordinate to a non-risk-dominated outcome with a 
group-size of six, but not at group sizes larger than 6. And finally, we claim pattern 
validation because for a group size of two, there was a high likelihood of coordinating to 
                                                
8 The laboratory experiments used for comparison did not test groups of sizes 4, 5, 7, 10, or 11.  
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a non-risk-dominated outcome; however, the addition of even one extra person drastically 
reduces the ability to coordinate, and increasing group size additionally continued this 
pattern, both in the laboratory and in the agent-based model. A linear regression run on 
the model data found that the group size had a statistically significant relationship to the 
coordination outcomes (p < .001). 
Intervention One: Growth 
The baseline model is extended to test whether using a growth mechanism during the 
minimum-effort game will increase the likelihood of coordination in larger outcomes. In 
a run with a final group-size of 12, the game will start with two people playing the 
minimum-effort game while a third person watches. In the next round the person who 
was watching will join in the game play and a fourth person will be added to observe the 
game. This pattern continues until there are 12 players in the room all playing the game. 
Having a player observe one round before participating is motivated by an experiment 
(described in greater detail later in this chapter) that also uses growth in coordination 
games (Weber, 2006).  
Agents 
Both players and links have the same characteristics as players and links in the baseline 
model. Players agents are extended to have a binomial variable active?. If  active? is set 
to true then a player is actively playing in a particular round. If active? is set to false than 
they are observing the outcome of the round, but they are not participating in the game or 
influencing the outcome of the game.  Observing agents in the model are represented by 
the color gray.  
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Environment 
The group-size variable represents the final size for the group. All groups start with only 
two active players and add one player each round until the final group size is reached. 
One new variable in the growth model is the observation-update variable. Similar to the 
participation-update variable, this variable is used to update the attitude, based on the 
round-outcome, that an active player has toward a participant observing, but not 
participating in the game play. Knowing someone observed an outcome is a way of 
knowing that the two players have both observed the same events in the model’s history, 
though it does not provide the same degree of information as actually having played with 
another person. For this reason, the observation-update variable is set between 0 – 1 and 
is less than the participation-update variable. In the model, the observation-update 
variable is set to 0.5.  
Interactions / rules 
The baseline model will be run adding one player to the game each round until the 
simulation reaches the final group-size. 
Setup 
In group-sizes of 3 or higher, during the setup of the model, three players and their 
associated links to other players are created. Two players have active? set to true and the 
third player has active? set to false, see Figure 11.  
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Figure 11: Setup in growth condition of group sizes 3-12. Blue players are active and 
making a strong-chain choice; the gray player is observing the play of the others 
Play round 
Playing a round is similar to the baseline model, where players make a strong or weak 
link choice, receive payoffs, and update their attitudes toward others. However, in the 
growth game, only players with active? set to true make a strong or weak link choice, and 
that choice is based on an evaluation of their attitudes toward only other players with 
active? set to true. 
Updating attitudes 
The final step of each round is to update the attitudes of players toward all other players, 
based upon the group outcome. Both active players and observers update their attitudes 
toward all other players based on the group outcome in each round. If the group-outcome 
was a weak chain, each attitude toward people who participated would be updated using 
the participation-update variable according to the following calculation: 
 updated-attitude = current-attitude – (current-attitude * participation-update)  
If the outcome was a strong chain: 
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 updated-attitude = current-attitude + ((1 – current-attitude) * participation-update)  
If the group-outcome was a weak chain, the attitude of all links directed at people who 
observed would be updated using the observation-update variable according to the 
following calculation: 
 updated-attitude = current-attitude – (current-attitude * observation-update)  
If a the outcome was a strong chain:  
 updated-attitude = current-attitude + ((1 – current-attitude) * observation-update)  
At this point all existing attitudes have been updated based on the group outcome and 
activity status of the players.  
Next round 
At the beginning of the next round, and all rounds until the final round, the following 
sequence of events occurs. First, the player that observed in the previous round is made 
active and will participate in the current round. Next a new player is added to the room to 
observe, see Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12: Growth round 2, now three active players and one new observer 
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When the new player is added to the room, new links are created from each current 
player to the new player based on each individual’s generic-attitude. For the new player, 
they form links to all existing players based upon their own generic-attitude. The new 
player is not active and does not participate in the next round of the game.   
Final round 
In the final round of the growth model the new participant that was added in the previous 
round is made active, and no new participants are added. All players play one final round 
of the chain-building game.   
Measurements 
There are two possible outcomes of the model. Figure 13 shows a screen-shot from the 
Netlogo growth model of a weak-chain outcome, and Figure 14 shows a screen-shot of a 
weak-chain outcome. 
 
Figure 13: Weak-chain outcome 
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Figure 14: Strong-chain outcome 
The brightness of the links represents the attitude of one player to another. Brighter links 
indicate an attitude that someone is more likely to build a strong link. A faded link 
indicates an attitude that someone is less likely to build a strong link. The brightness of 
the players also represents the certainty with which they made their choice to build a link. 
Faded players are close to the threshold between choices.   
Results 
Growth matters. A one-way ANOVA comparison of the final outcomes of the growth and 
no-growth conditions for 11 different group-sizes (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) 
showed significant overall differences, (F (1, 4281)= 3.4, p < .001.), see Figure 15 for a 
results comparison of the no-growth condition of the model, the no-growth laboratory 
findings from the literature, and the growth model.  
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Figure 15: Percent of non-risk dominated outcomes with different group sizes in the 
literature, baseline model, and growth model 
Model Verification 
The growth intervention of the model is verified by comparing the results with the recent 
findings from a laboratory experiment that also used growth as an intervention to increase 
the likelihood of coordination in large groups (Weber, 2006). 
Verification based on experimental studies 
In Weber’s laboratory study, 12 people played a minimum-effort game similar to those 
previously described with seven different chain strengths. The experiment was designed 
to test steady growth and whether new entrants observing the previous performance of 
the smaller group could produce groups coordinated to stronger-chain equilibriums than 
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control groups that started out large and did not change size. The two conditions of the 
experiment were: 
1. Control group: Twelve subjects played the game for twelve rounds 
2. Growth group: New entrants observe the group’s history of previous choices 
In each round each player chose a number 1-7 to correspond to the strength of chain link 
they wanted to build and gave their choice to the experimenter. The experimenter 
calculated the strength of the chain based on the minimum value given and then wrote the 
chain strength on a board for the group to observe. Before the next round the board was 
erased and the next round started. In the growth condition, at commonly known times, 
other participants joined the group of those actively playing in the game. The growth 
conditions ran for 22 rounds, compared to the 12 in the control group. Extra rounds were 
added so that in the growth condition the first two participants could repeatedly play the 
game before new participants joined. When playing in a group of two, repeated 
interactions increased, but did not guarantee the likelihood that the two would coordinate 
to a highly efficient equilibrium. In the history condition both people actively playing and 
those that were added later were present in the room. In both conditions all twelve people 
played in the last few rounds.  
Weber’s Laboratory Results  
The control group with no growth that started out at a large size mimicked the results of 
previous experiments in which no groups were able to coordinate above the risk-
dominated, weak-link strategy. In the history condition, when the group was of size two 
they were able to coordinate to a Pareto-efficient, strong-chain outcome. Groups that 
grew when new members observed previous behavior were able to coordinate at higher 
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levels of efficiency, including the strong-chain outcome. However, growth did not 
guarantee the strong-chain outcome. In some cases these groups reverted to the risk-
dominated strategy. Subjects in the growth condition were able to coordinate on the 
strong-chain outcome 22% of the time, on the risk-dominated, weak-chain outcome 44% 
of the time, and somewhere in between (medium strength chain) 33% of the time.  If the 
initial stages of the game produced the risk-dominated outcome, then the end result was 
also a risk-dominated outcome. Every time that a strong chain was the final outcome, the 
initial interactions also resulted in a strong-chain outcome. This experiment shows that 
the use of growth is a potential mechanism for achieving coordination in large groups 
with real people, something that had previously not been obtainable in a laboratory 
setting. 
Comparison of laboratory with model 
In both the model and the laboratory experiment the growth intervention enabled, but did 
not guarantee, the strong-chain outcome of groups of size 12. A close examination of the 
model outcome also finds that the pattern of individual results follows the qualitative 
results of the Weber (2006) experiment. Both methods found groups that were not able to 
coordinate above the risk-dominated outcome in the first round, groups that coordinated 
for a few rounds and then transitioned to the risk-dominated outcome before reaching the 
full group size, and groups that coordinated the entire time. The general proportion of 
groups that were able to coordinate the entire time was also similar: 27% for the agent-
based model and 22% for the laboratory experiment using the calibration settings from 
the baseline model. Finally, in either the lab or the model, there were no groups that 
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started out within the risk-dominated outcome and then transitioned to the strong-chain 
outcome9.   
Discussion 
To revisit the four goals of the chapter: a baseline agent-based model of agents playing a 
minimum-effort chain building game was introduced (1). The model was calibrated at the 
process level my mimicking the design of previous experiments that used the minimum-
effort game. The model was calibrated at the parameter level by adjusting the average-
attitudes and performance-update variables to reasonably simulate previous laboratory 
experiments of different size groups playing minimum-effort games (2). 
After this calibration process, the model was extended through the addition of the 
growth intervention (3). This intervention was motivated by the Colorado collaborative 
partnerships that used a similar growth process starting with a small initial group when 
developing their working group.  The model indicated that growth enables more 
coordination in larger groups than a large to begin with condition and then verified the 
growth intervention with a laboratory finding that used a similar intervention (4) (Weber, 
2006).  
Like all good models, the baseline and growth models provide some insight into 
the larger phenomenon of interest and also raise additional questions.  
                                                
9 Weber’s experiment also tested another condition in which growth occurred, but new entrants joined the 
group with no knowledge of the group’s history. Without knowledge of previous group behavior, these 
groups preformed similar to the no-growth, control condition, failing to coordinate to the strong-chain 
outcome. The agent-based model also tested a similar condition, growth without observation, and the 
results were similar to the laboratory no-history condition. In 1,000 rounds, no groups of size 12 achieved a 
strong-chain outcome.  
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Both the model and the laboratory study show that early interactions are very 
important. This is consistent with previous findings. Gersick (1988) studied the entire life 
cycle of eight naturally occurring teams and found that people’s first interactions with 
each other set lasting precedents that affect the ways in which members of the team will 
relate to each other and perform for the remainder of the project. In the model, groups 
that started as weak-chain builders were never able to switch and become strong chain 
builders. In the lab, groups that did not have early strong-chain interactions also never 
transitioned to strong-chain builders later in the experiment. A similar quality was 
reported during the interviews with the directors of IIK: 
 
Deputy Director of IIK: I have see communities go from adequately performing 
to low and high-performing to low, but not the other direction.  
 
This is consistent with correlation found in the Colorado NFP collaboration that groups 
with a low-quality planning process will likely be low-performing for the lifecycle of the 
program (Hicks, et. al. submitted 2006).  
Additionally, by observing the model in progress, rather than simply recording the 
final outcome, it was apparent that in the growth cases that started out with early 
coordination but then failed, it was the addition of new participants and the choices they 
made that caused the group to fail. Until recently, the growth process, and the challenges 
associated with when and how people join a collaborative partnership, have been largely 
overlooked. In the majority of group research, as with Gersik’s work, the established 
group has been the central unit of investigation (Kelly, 1990; McGrath, 1991; Wrochel, 
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1994; Arrow et. al, 2000). The challenge of transferring to program outcomes the benefits 
of including a growth process in the initial planning stage raises the question, what is it 





Exploratory Agent-based Model 
 
All models are wrong, some are useful. 
- George Box    
Introduction 
If growth in and of itself only allows for the existence of strong chains in 22% of the 
laboratory cases and 27% of the model cases, what differences in the growth process 
cause some groups to form strong chains and other groups to form weak chains? The 
previous chapter suggests that early interactions set the path of the group, and that strong-
performing groups can be destabilized by the inclusion of new participants who choose to 
build weak-links. The observations of the Colorado NFP programs suggest at least two 
distinguishing characteristics, either of which could account for high-performing groups: 
• A high-quality deliberative planning process 
• The gradual inclusion of new participants  
The goal of this chapter is to use agent-based modeling, a technique that allows us to test 
each intervention, first in isolation and then combined. Comparing results from the 
growth model in chapter two to a model including each intervention, we can isolate the 
competing effects of each characteristic of high-quality collaborations. The comparison 
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of these results will be discussed in relation to previous findings and will be verified with 
observations from the NFP communities in Colorado.  
Intervention Two: Deliberative Planning / Slow Growth 
One characteristic of more successful collaborative partnerships was the ability to 
develop according to their own schedule. A result of developing at a natural pace instead 
of being driven by external timetables was the ability to engage in a deliberative process, 
even if that deliberation slowed down the process. At least two community 
implementations were delayed to make sure that everyone in the working group was on-
board.  
 To test a deliberative planning process we identify characteristics that might 
articulate a deliberative planning process and focus on the rate of growth. At the 
conclusion of his laboratory study of managing growth, Weber (2006) also indicated but 
did not prove that the rate of growth, and the ability to take advantage of growth, might 
play an important role as an intervention. He allowed managers to determine when to add 
new people to a group, and initially they all added people too quickly, resulting in low-
performing groups. However, when given another chance, the managers slowed down the 
rate of growth and half of them were able to successfully manage the growth of their 
groups to the equivalent of a strong-chain equilibrium.  
Agents 
Both players and links have all of the characteristics of the players and links in the 
previous growth model.  
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Environment 
The growth-rate variable represents the pace that the group grows. With a growth-rate 
value of 1 a new player will be added to the group each round. With this variable setting, 
this model is functionally equivalent to the growth model. With a growth-rate value of 2, 
a new player will be added every other round, with a growth-rate value of 3, a new player 
will be added every third round, and so on. Growth-rate values of 1, 2, and 3 were tested 
in this model.  
Interactions / rules 
The final group-size is 12 in all versions of this model. One consequence of changing the 
growth rate is that for growth rates greater than 1, the length of the game also had to be 
increased to allow for the group to grow to size 12.  
Setup 
During the setup of the model, three players and their associated links to other players are 
established. Two players will be active and one player will observe.  
Play round 
For each round, all active players will play the minimum-effort game following the same 
sequence of events as the growth model. First, active players will choose to build a weak 
or strong link based on their attitudes about the choices they expect other active players’ 
to make. Then the links are combined, and the group outcome is calculated. Finally, all 
agents update their attitudes according to the same formulae from the growth model.  
Next round 
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At the beginning of the next round the current round number is modded by the growth-
rate. If the value is 0, then a new player is added. Put more clearly: with a growth rate of 
1, one player is added in rounds [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, and 10], with a growth rate of 2, one 
player is added in rounds [2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18], and with a growth rate of 3, 
one player is added in rounds [3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, and 27]. When a new player is 
added, he or she is added as an observer and the observer in the previous round is made 
active. So there is always one person observing until the final round, whereupon the last 
observer will become active in rounds 11, 20, and 30.  
Measurements 
There are two possible outcomes of the model: a strong-chain outcome and a weak-chain 
outcome.  
Results 
The model was run 1,000 times at growth rates 1, 2, and 3.  
Slow growth 
Slow growth matters. In the model with a growth-rate of 1 (a model equivalent to the 
growth model from chapter 2) and a group size of 12, there were 254 strong-chain 
outcomes over 1,000 rounds. When the growth-rate was changed to 2, there were 943 
strong-chain outcomes over 1,000 rounds. Comparing the percentage of strong-chain 
outcomes at a growth-rate of 1 and a growth-rate of 2, a one-way ANOVA of outcomes 
over 1,000 rounds found a statistically significant difference (F (1) = 1056, p < .001). See 
Figure 16 for a comparison of the outcomes at the two growth rates.  
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Figure 16: Comparison of growth model with growth-rate set to 1 and 2 
Extra time 
One interesting result showed that although there was a significant improvement in 
performance when changing the growth rate from 1 to 2, there was no additional benefit 
from changing the growth rate from 2 to 3. When the growth rate was changed to 3, over 
1,000 runs, there were 939 strong-chain outcomes, slightly lower than a growth rate of 2 
and accountable by the normal variation of the model over that many runs. See Figure 17 




Figure 17: Comparison of growth model with growth-rate set to 1, 2, and 3 
Intervention three: Gradual inclusion / small chains 
Another characteristic of more successful collaborative partnerships was the way in 
which new members were added to the collaborative partnerships. Theories of 
organizational learning suggest that learning how to perform in groups often takes place 
through legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 
1991). Accordingly, individuals first observe or play minor roles in the activities of a 
community before gradually participating more actively. In the high-performing 
communities in the NFP in Colorado, the community made an extra effort to thoughtfully 
include new members and share with them the history of the group. To extend the growth 
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model from chapter 2, active new participants will evaluate their possible choices based 
on the interaction with a limited number of group members. As they continue to play, 
they will base their decisions on interactions with an increasing number of other players 
until they are fully integrated into the group.  
Agents 
Player agents have the same characteristics as the growth model. Link agents have all the 
same characteristics as the growth model as well as a new variable, playing?. This 
binomial variable still maintains the attitude that one player has toward another, but now 
also monitors who the player is interacting with, regarding which choice to make. In the 
growth model, players based their decision on their attitudes of all active players. In the 
small-chain model, players might base their decisions on a subset of active players. The 
playing? variable in the links keeps track of which other players are in that subset.  
Environment 
The only new environmental variable is small-chains?, a binomial variable that, when set 
to false, the model will behave identically to the growth model, and when set to true, will 
gradually include new players. All other environmental variables are the same as the 
growth condition.  
Interactions / rules 
The model is tested with a final group size of 12 in all versions of this model. One 
consequence of slowly adding new participants is that, to allow for full integration, extra 
rounds must be played after everyone has become active.  
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Setup 
The setup in the small chains model is the same as the growth model.  
Play round 
Playing a round is similar to the growth model where players make a strong or weak-link 
choice, receive payoffs, and update their attitudes of others. However, an active player 
might not use all other players to evaluate its choice, but only the other players at the end 
of active links. In Figure 18, the blue and red players are making their determination 
based only on the players at the other end of the purple, active, links. The black links 
represent the attitudes of others not actively interacting with the player. For instance, at 
the bottom left, the gray player is observing this round is not active. The red player on the 
left has chosen to build a weak link based on its assessment of the person on the right and 
the person at the bottom right. The red player’s attitude of the player at the top did not 
influence its choice.  
 
Figure 18: NetLogo model of the small chain intervention 
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If a player has an active link to another player, that player also has an active link to the 
original player.  
Updating attitudes 
Updating attitudes is the same as in the growth model.  
Next round 
At the beginning of the next round, players with non-playing links will randomly switch 
one of these non-playing links to playing. They will also have the player at the other end 
of the link switch their link with the original player, from non-playing to playing. An 
agent can only have one link switch to playing each round.  
Final round 
In the final round of the small-chain model all links will be active and the group will play 
the game as if players were in the final round of the growth model.  
Measurements 
There are two possible outcomes of the model, the weak-chain outcome and the strong-
chain outcome. 
Results 
The thoughtful inclusion of new participants, articulated through small chains in the 
model, matters. The model was run 1,000 times without small chains and 1,000 times 
with small chains. In the model without small chains (a model equivalent to the growth 
model from chapter 2) and a group size of 12, there were 254 strong-chain outcomes over 
1,000 rounds. When the small-chain intervention was turned on, over 1,000 runs, there 
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were 943 strong-chain outcomes10. A one-way ANOVA of outcome on 1,000 rounds 
comparing the percentage of strong-chain outcomes at a growth-rate of 1 and a growth-
rate of 2 found a statistically significant difference (F (1) = 1096, p < .001). See Figure 
19 for a comparison of the outcomes with and without the small-chain intervention.  
 
Figure 19: Results from 1000 rounds of different group sizes 
Combining the Slow-growth and Small-chain Interventions 
We want to test to see whether there are additive effects of a model that uses both 
interventions. To test this we combine the previous two interventions. Specifically, in 
                                                
10 The no-small chain and no-growth conditions in both comparisons were the same set of 1,000 trials and 
that accounts for them having the same outcome (254). However, it was purely by chance that both the 
small-chain and slow growth interventions resulted in the same outcome (943). Running the same model 
another 1,000 runs, the small-chain intervention produced 934 strong-chain outcomes and the slow growth 
intervention produced 928.  
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every round of the model players increase the active links they use to make decisions, not 
only when there is a growth. The individual and combined effects are reported in Figure 
20.  
 
Figure 20: Individual and combined effects of interventions 
Both interventions produced 943 strong-chain outcomes, but when a model used both 
interventions, there was only a slight increase to 956 strong-chain outcomes. This 
difference was not statistically significant (p > .05).  
Discussion 
The key observation from this chapter is that both the slow-growth and small-chain 
interventions were successful at increasing the likelihood of successful coordination in 
the minimum-effort game. Before unpacking the individual and combined effects of each 
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intervention, I want to focus on the importance of this observation. Regardless of the 
research method used--the growth model in chapter two, Weber’s (2006) laboratory 
findings, or the field study of communities in NFP, we found the same patterns of results; 
groups fell into one of these three categories. 
1. Groups failing to coordinate from the beginning (weak-chain) 
2. Groups starting to coordinate and then failing as they grew (weak-chain) 
3. Groups initially coordinating and able to continue coordination (strong-chain) 
The findings suggest that collaborative partnerships have a higher variance of outcomes 
than programs that use a traditional top-down implementation style. In the observations 
of the NFP communities in Colorado, even when all three of these outcomes occurred, 
the performance of the Colorado collaborative partnerships, on average, was still higher 
than the national average. If this research leads to a design of best practices that 
increases, even slightly, the likelihood of even a few collaborative partnerships building 
strong chains, the potential for overall program improvement is enormous. An even more 
desirable result would see improvements in the field match the improvement in the agent-
based model, in which groups were more often able to achieve strong-chain outcomes (a 
371% improvement).  
Insights from the Model 
The models in this chapter provided some guidance into interventions that could help 
increase the likelihood that groups will coordinate successfully. What the model found 
was that both the small-chain and slow-growth interventions were effective approaches 
for addressing the problem of groups that coordinated initially, but where new members 
destabilized existing players who were previously coordinating. When either intervention 
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was being used, coordination rarely started with early strong-chain interactions and ended 
in weak-chain outcomes, but within the initial group playing the game, coordination 
never materialized. Therefore, both interventions of the model address the challenge of 
adding new players, but have yet to satisfy the need for interventions that focus on 
improving the likelihood that early interactions will lead to coordination. One weakness 
of the current experiments within the model is that the experiments do not indicate which 
intervention is more effective at minimizing the challenge of new participants joining an 
existing group. The model does provide insight into some of the characteristics of each 
intervention.  
Unique qualities of small-chain intervention  
During the course of building and testing the model, I observed four qualities that were 
unique to the small-chain intervention. First, multiple players can be added to a small 
group so that they increase their participation along an overlapping timeline. Second, 
though the intervention occurs on the individual level, it had a group level result, 
significantly increasing the likelihood of coordination. The intervention is considered 
individual because the existing players in the model do not treat new participants 
differently. Third, the gradual inclusion of new participants decreased the failures of new 
participants but did not eliminate them. I observed some instances where coordination 
was successful in the early rounds, but broke down as the game continued. There was still 
a risk of new players choosing not to build a strong link even after one round of 
observation and having played with only one person. Finally, while the overall results of 
improving the likelihood of strong-chain outcomes were similar to the slow-growth 
outcome, the final coordinated outcome was achieved in fewer rounds. If there is a high 
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actual or opportunity cost to each round, and a program implemented can only choose to 
utilize one intervention, this is the preferred method by which to increase the likelihood 
of successful coordination within a group.  
Unique qualities of slow growth intervention 
The model also provided three insights into some surprising characteristics of the slow-
growth intervention. First, slowing down the rate of growth helps in environments where 
there is difficulty including members, but the relationship of the growth rate to the 
likelihood of program outcomes is not continuous. There seems to be a threshold at 
which a certain amount of extra time would benefit outcomes. However, once that 
threshold is reached, the additional slowing of growth does not help and could in fact be 
counterproductive, particularly if you factor in the actual or opportunity costs of the 
delay, the momentum of programs, and the patience of willing participants. Second, 
slowing the growth at this phase of the program is a group level intervention and 
everyone was affected because the group took additional time. Third this intervention 
eliminated the risk of new participants making a risk-dominated choice because it took 
advantage of some of the characteristics inherent in the structure of the minimum-effort 
game. Particularly, both strong links and weak links are rational choices; repeatedly 
playing games with the same group of people reduced the uncertainty over what the rest 
of the group might choose to do and reinforced the players’ attitudes that others were 
going to build a strong link.  
The concept of returning to equilibrium despite minor destabilizing acts is known 
as a basin of attraction (Skryms, 2004). The destabilizing act in the model is the 
introduction of a new player to the group. Robust equilibrium is one of the key dynamics 
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that distinguish the minimum-effort game from a repeated prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 
1984). With the minimum-effort game, the members of the population will self-regulate 
isolated deviations from the equilibrium, regardless of whether the equilibrium is weak or 
strong chain building. In the NFP communities that we studied, basin of attraction is one 
explanation for why high-performing groups continued to perform at a high level, and 
low-performing groups performed at a low level despite a high turnover of the people 
who were directly involved. The basin of attraction is a self-regulating force present in 
minimum-effort games; but this force has limits. Given time, the basin of attraction can 
mitigate the risk that new participants might destabilize the strong-chain environment. 
However, if a program grows too quickly, sometimes as a result of focusing on growth 
rather than on a high-quality process, it could be possible introduce more risk into the 
environment than the basin of attraction can mitigate. As a result, a group that had been 
coordinating towards a strong chain could suddenly fall apart. A potential feature of a 
highly deliberative planning process is the ability to accurately identify when a 
community is ready to grow and when a community should “play a few extra rounds” to 
reinforce the current attitudes. By allowing the basin of attraction to reinforce strong-link 
beliefs, the community as a whole is more robust to the inclusion of new participants.  
Unique qualities of combining small chains and slow growth 
When the two interventions are combined, their individual contributions are not obvious. 
Those advantages that increased the likelihood of achieving a strong-chain outcome 
realized by the small-chain intervention were also achieved by the slow growth 
intervention. However, in the slow-growth intervention, there were no instances of new 
members breaking-up existing strong-chain groups, whereas this did occur in the small 
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chains intervention, albeit rarely11.  While there was not a significant benefit of using both 
methods in the model, in the field, the mechanism might work as a redundant or fail-safe 
contribution, one backing up the other if either should fail for some reason. Also, in the 
model, these interventions are either present or absent. In the field both are present to 
some degree and designing collaborative partnerships with both in mind could have an 
additive effect.  
                                                
11 The model was not designed to count how many groups that ended in a weak-chain outcome formed 
strong-chains in the early rounds. One monitor added to the model did record the round when strong chains 
switched to weak chains. That this monitor was greater than 1 in some small-chain intervention runs 








All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them. 
-- Galieleo Galilei 
 
Introduction 
This chapter has four goals. First, I analyze how the findings from the previous chapters 
contribute to the literature and to our understanding of the growth process in civic 
collaborations. Second, based on the findings of this research, I make policy 
recommendations for both the implementers of the NFP programs in Colorado as well as 
states that might soon implement NFP because of the current proposed legislation. Third, 
I explore the limitations of the current research. Finally, I will propose a research agenda 
that expands the current agent-based model, extends the field study to new locations and 
programs, outlines laboratory studies that test new growth interventions, and also tests 
how people can use the agent-based model to make policy decisions.  
Contributions 
Civic collaborations have been shown to be effective implementation strategies for the 
NFP program. In practice, using a bottom-up growth strategy has, on average, produced 
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results better than the national average on several key measures of program success. 
However, performance across the Colorado communities that have used this strategy is 
not consistent. We used a collection of interviews, community narratives, questionnaires, 
and program outcomes to identify characteristics that distinguish Colorado from other 
NFP implementations (the growth process) and characteristics that distinguish high-
performing from low-performing communities in Colorado (a deliberative planning 
process and the thoughtful inclusion of new participants). We chose to use game theory 
to create a formal approach by which to analyze the interaction between individuals in 
Colorado and rationalize how potential interventions might influence program outcomes. 
We identified the minimum-effort game, illustrated by the chain-building analogy, as the 
most appropriate game theoretic situation for representing the NFP collaborative 
partnerships in Colorado. The decision to use the minimum-effort game was motivated 
by three main factors. First, there was no individual incentive to deviate from the rest of 
the group. Second, in situations where individuals felt a perceived risk in contributing 
they can choose a risk-dominated strategy. And third, the deviation of key people can 
jeopardize group outcomes.  
 In chapter two we introduced a baseline agent-based model of agents playing a 
minimum-effort chain-building game. The variables of the baseline model were 
calibrated by comparing model outcomes of different size groups with different variable 
settings to a collection of laboratory experiments of different size groups playing the 
minimum-effort game. The model was then expanded to include a growth intervention. 
Findings from the model showed that growth was an effective mechanism to increase the 
likelihood of successful coordination within groups. Although there was an improvement 
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in the overall performance outcomes, the largest groups were still only able to coordinate 
to the strong chain outcome only 27% of the time. Within the model, coordination 
failures occurred either because the initial participants failed to coordinate to a strong-
chain outcome or a strongly performing group added a new member that disrupted the 
group’s coordination, resulting in a weak-chain outcome. The growth model was then 
verified by comparing its pattern of results to the pattern of results produced in a recent 
laboratory experiment that used a similar intervention (Weber, 2006). 
 In chapter three the model was expanded to investigate which characteristics of 
the growth process increase its chances of success. Two interventions motivated by the 
field were tested. A deliberative planning process was articulated in the model as “slow 
growth” to represent the time taken to focus on the problem and better understand the 
issues and concerns of all involved. The thoughtful inclusion of new participants was 
articulated in the model as “new participants making a decision to build a strong or weak 
link based on limited interactions.” The model showed that both interventions were 
successful at reducing the risk that the addition of new participants would destabilize a 
strong-chain group. While the small-chain intervention was able to increase the 
likelihood of strong chains in less time, the slow-growth intervention eliminated the 
chance that new participants would disrupt a strong-chain group entirely. The slow-
growth intervention also showed a significant improvement when the growth rate was 
slowed down; however, slowing the growth rate further yielded no additional benefit. 




Current legislation proposes a bill to invest $15B in mandating the availability of the NFP 
program in all fifty states. Policy makers of the current NFP program in Colorado, and 
those of other states implementing new NFP programs, will hopefully benefit from the 
findings of the current research by increasing the effectiveness of civic collaborations 
and, in turn, the likelihood of positive collaboration outcomes.   
Current Nurse Family Partnership in Colorado 
Motivated by insights from the agent-based models discussed previously, this dissertation 
proposes four immediate policy recommendations to avert potential breakdowns in the 
process of building collaborative partnerships. First, program managers should require a 
consensus to implement a program before progressing from the planning stage. If the 
group is conflicted or not fully coordinated on the appropriate method of implementing 
the program, then early failures could lead to long-term problems. This recommendation 
is to a large extent already in place in Colorado. Second, program managers should allow 
poorly performing groups to die with dignity. One of the dynamics of the model is that 
strong chains can transition to weak chains, but there were no instances of a weak chain 
becoming strong. Instead of repeatedly investing in low-performing groups, hoping they 
might gradually improve, a more efficient strategy would be cut the losses and refocus 
energy and resources on new projects that could start out fresh or reinvest current 
resources into increasing the scope of high-performing programs. The third 
recommendation is to allow group members to vote out existing participants that are not 
“strong-link builders.” Currently the programs in Colorado never ask people to leave. 
However, this exposes them to the poison pill or rotten apple situation, in which the 
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counter-productive efforts of a single individual can ruin an entire collaboration. A recent 
experiment of people playing the minimum effort game allowed participants to vote 
people into or out of their groups, with the result that it was possible to coordinate at the 
Pareto-efficient outcome (Charness & Yang, 2006). A final policy recommendation is to 
evaluate programs on the quality of the planning process and not the rate at which they 
progress through artificial deadlines or milestones. A natural progression through the 
program stages allows for the development of a deliberative planning process.  
National Nurse Family Partnership initiative 
If the Senate initiative is passed and NFP is mandated across all 50 states, direct 
consequences will likely follow, affecting the outcomes of individual program 
implementations. First, most programs will probably be implemented in a top-down non-
collaborative partnership system. One expected benefit of this approach is greater 
consistency and fidelity across different program implementations. This approach would 
also result in greater access to the program and the assurance that all communities would 
implement it. However, a mandated, top-down approach might not be able to replicate 
some of the performance outcomes observed when using collaborative partnerships in 
Colorado.  
Based on the model findings, I would recommend the following four 
modifications to the current legislation. First, instead of mandating the implementation of 
the program in all states, what should instead be mandated is the availability of 
governmental resources for communities that choose to implement the program. 
However, to receive these resources, communities would have to meet specific 
guidelines. To evaluate whether communities meet the requirements, two types of 
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specialist, facilitators and evaluators, would be trained. Facilitators would help bring key 
members of the community together, fulfilling a role similar to that of IIK in Colorado. 
Facilitators would also have access to seed funding that could help offset initial planning 
costs. In addition, they would work with the communities and focus on the process of 
including new people from the planning phase through the implementation of the 
program. Evaluators would be trained to assess the quality of the planning process, based 
on the specific indicators of a deliberative planning process, namely, whether the process 
authentic, inclusive, and focused on the problem (Hicks & Larson, 2003). If the 
evaluators were to determine there was a deliberative planning process, then the 
community would receive government funds to implement the program. Finally, I 
recommend that part of the $15B be spent on grants to the Incentive Centered Design 
group at the University of Michigan and the new Center for Policy Informatics at Arizona 
State University to continue to study how these programs might be better implemented.  
Limitations  
There are several caveats in generalizing the results from this study — some that arise 
from observations in the field and some suggested by the modeling process. In the field, 
the exploration into the growth process occurred retroactively, after the NFP programs 
had already been in place for years. While researchers were involved in the early phases 
of program development, there were no specific measurements in place to measure the 
qualities of the growth process or qualify how well new people were included into the 
program. Observations in this study occurred through interviews with program directors 
years after the initial planning stages. Another limitation of many field studies is that it is 
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nearly impossible to find statistically significant results from a small number of 
observations, in our case 16 communities.  
To create a model where the outcomes are tractable to specific interventions, we 
had to make several assumptions. Each assumption can potentially reduce the fidelity of 
the model to the interaction in the field and the laboratory. First, in the model, the players 
have only two choices (to build a strong link or a weak link), whereas in laboratory they 
were given seven different choices. Furthermore, in the field, stakeholders were never 
given a binary, “are you in or are you out” ultimatum. The levels and types of 
contribution were far more nuanced than a weak- or strong-link decision. Another 
limitation is that in the model and the laboratory, all participants make the same choice, 
have the same influence, and can receive the same reward for their actions. The 
contributions of stakeholders in the field were not equivalent between participants in 
terms of degree or type. Also, in the field, there are complicated political histories, power 
differences, and a wide variety of other factors that cannot easily be accounted for or 
discounted within the model. By contrast, the game in the model and the laboratory is 
played in a vacuum. The groups in the field are pulled from the context of greater 
environmental variables like: current economic conditions, the existence of other similar 
programs, or the political climate within the state. However, even given these limitations, 




One of the benefits of a multi-method research agenda is that conducting work on each of 
many different fronts can advance the research. I propose: 1) an ongoing research agenda 
to improve the current growth model, 2) advancing field research with respect to the 
proposed legislation, and 3) laboratory experiments that target specific questions that 
would be valuable to explore with human subjects.  
Developing the Growth Model 
Four immediate ways to develop the current model are: improving calibration, testing 
new interventions, developing new measurements, or redesigning the model for a new 
audience.  
Calibration 
The current model calibrates the average-attitudes variable by assessing how differences 
in the variables translate into changes in performance outcomes and then by comparing 
those outcomes to previous studies. The distribution in the average-attitudes variable is 
taken to be a normal distribution with an assumed mean. Instead of using these 
assumptions, it is possible to use characteristics collected directly from the individuals 
participating in the collaborations through interviews and surveys. Some of this 
information is already available. Using the Working Together Instrument (Appendix 1) 
and the Process Quality Instrument (Appendix 2), communities could be characterized by 
their average attitudes and the amount of variation within the community. Though not 
analyzed in the current research, variations in these two qualities might suggest 
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significant differences in program outcomes and thus might lead to a valuable and 
adaptable tool with which policy makers could design interventions for groups based on 
the heterogeneity and distributions of attitudes.  
Interventions 
While growth, a deliberative planning process, and the thoughtful inclusion of new 
participants were the most readily apparent qualities that distinguished the high-
performing NFP communities in Colorado, other interventions, suggested by the 
interviews and community narratives, could also increase the likelihood of achieving high 
quality collaborative partnerships. I will propose and very briefly describe some other 
possible interventions to test either alone or in combination with other interventions.  
The first intervention is to model the contribution of facilitators in collaborative 
partnerships. What is the role of the facilitation provided by IIK in helping to build these 
collaborations? We identify three potential influences of facilitators. First the presence of 
such a facilitator might reduce the risk of players building weak links. Second, a strong 
facilitator might be able to force the choice of individual players. Third, a facilitator 
could allow faster updating of attitudes, decreasing the time the needed to move from 
planning to execution. But when should facilitators be involved in the program? One 
observation from our interviews suggested that facilitation is necessary at the start of the 
collaboration: 
Executive Director of IIK:  When you were starting fresh you could engage 
judges and leaders because it was an exciting opportunity. However, but 
once the program was there, you had a different group that you were dealing 
with.  On the whole retroactive collaborations were fairly ineffective at 
getting people passionate and involved. 
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A second intervention to test is how robust the growth findings are in different 
games, different payoff structures, or combinations of multiple games in the same 
environment. While the minimum-effort game is vulnerable to noise or poison pills, if 
NFP had the ability to vote dissenters out, how would the dynamics change when the 
game is switched to a median-effort game, in which players’ payoffs are tied the effort of 
the median player in a group? Similarly, how would the dynamics of the game change if 
the minimum player was ignored each round? How would growth be different if the 
challenge was a pure coordination game and the individual dilemma, instead of whether 
or not to participate in one program, was the need to coordinate on one of many programs 
that were otherwise equal?  
Let me briefly suggest four other possible interventions. First, in the current 
model everyone participating observes a common group outcome. Could the performance 
of the group perhaps be improved by controlling access to information and distinguishing 
local and global information? Second, might large groups build strong chains by 
developing a series of small strong-chain groups in parallel and then merging them 
together? Third, can the same benefits of growth be realized even when starting with 
large initial groups by using variations on the small chain intervention? One idea would 
be to allow everyone to play multiple minimum-effort games with a limited number of 
participants and then slowly increase the number of players they are participating with, 
while maintaining the overall number of players. Finally, can the addition of new people 
to a group be based on assessments of the group’s state and by calculating the size and 
speed of additions the group can manage with a given probability or risk?  
Measurements  
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The model described in the dissertation only recorded whether the outcome of the group 
was a strong chain or a weak chain. The addition of new measurements to the model can 
help tease apart individual intervention contributions. I recommend three improvements. 
First, it would be valuable to record the average attitudes of the participants in the round. 
This measure is like taking the temperature of the attitudes in the round and could be used 
to determine whether there would be any benefit in delaying the addition of a new group 
member and to realize the benefits of basins of attraction only when necessary. Second, it 
would be valuable to record in which round the group first built a weak chain and to 
count how many groups start with a strong chain and then switch to a weak chain. This 
measure would allow for insights into which phase of the growth process coordination 
was failing and would improve the understating of the effectiveness of interventions that 
target specific parts of the process. Third, the model would benefit from monitoring 
individuals’ attitudes, creating profiles of these attitudes in those cases when a player was 
the first player to build a weak link. By recording the source of the breakdown, it might 
be possible to identify environmental conditions, or other characteristics about the group, 
that could be targeted with future interventions.  
Audience 
Another potential direction for the development of the model is to design it for a new 
audience, practitioners. The model could be used as a tool kit for program managers and 
facilitators to visualize, design and test policy choices; test potential design choices; 
diagnose problems in current collaborations; and develop remedies to existing problems.  
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Developing the field research 
The field research can be developed in many directions. I will briefly examine other 
implementations of NFP, the case studies of other collaborative partnerships, and 
collaborative partnerships in other contexts, specifically in business and academics.  
Field experiments with other NFP implementations 
This is an exciting time to studying the NFP program. In April of 2007, a bill was 
proposed to the Senate recommending the nationwide implementation of the program. If 
passed, there will be an opportunity to research the implementation of the program from 
the initial stages of development, instead of retrospectively. One way to capitalize on this 
opportunity would be to create large-scale, controlled field experiments that test specific 
interventions in different states or across different communities within a state. One idea 
regarding interventions would be to provide all the necessary resources, but to make the 
program elective for the communities that decide to participate. Another option would be 
to allow states to choose between a top-down approach and an approach in which 
individual communities used collaborative partnerships to implement the program. 
Program outcomes would be measured using the current Clinical Information System and 
then tested to see whether the style of implementation had a significant effect on program 
outcomes.  
Other collaborative partnership case studies 
Invest in Kids is involved in other programs in Colorado that use a civic collaboration 
implementation strategy. Two such programs are Incredible Years (IY) and the Colorado 
Healthy Communities Initiative (CHCI), programs that were implemented with growth 
strategies with different characteristics than that employed by NFP. Exploring the unique 
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characteristics of these strategies can provide additional insight into other aspects of the 
growth process. IY is a supplemental school curriculum in 12 communities designed to 
promote social competence. Learning from its success with previous collaborative 
partnerships, IIK spread the IY program using a similar strategy.  However, IY did not 
share the same level of success as NFP. Unique to IY was the focus on rolling out the 
program in many communities quickly, and in fact rapid implementation in as many 
communities as possible was initially used as a measure of success. In many of the 
communities in which IY was developed, it also had the unique challenge of competing 
with many other school programs. Exploring the IY programs might provide insight into 
characteristics surrounding the rate of growth, as well as the challenges involved in 
distinguishing a program from other competing programs.  
CHCI is a program that provided 29 communities in Colorado with seed grants 
for collaborative partnerships to improve the overall health of the community. Unique to 
the CHCI program was a forced long, mandatory planning process. The overall program 
was very effective by nearly any measure. Exploring the role of the long planning process 
might provide insight into one of the unanswered questions of this research: What 
interventions are possible to avert breakdowns in the initial stages of collaborations?  
Other contexts using collaborative partnerships 
This research on the growth process in collaborative partnerships could also extend 
beyond civic collaborations to the development of business teams, academic 
collaborations, and a wide variety of other collaborations that are becoming increasingly 
common. In The Future of Work Tom Malone claims that work is naturally evolving 
toward the project as the central unit of interest instead of the university, corporation, or 
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organization (Malone, 2004). He asserts that projects traditionally handled by strict 
controlling hierarchies are now being taken on by collaborative partnerships, by which 
tasks are accomplished as if by "citizen participation" rather than by "hierarchically 
managed worker-bees." Collaborative partnerships are also increasing in frequency 
within many business settings because of an increased complexity of problems, as noted 
by LaFasto and Larson (2001): 
A steady increase in collaborative teams was reported in the adoption of 
collaborative strategies in the auto, steel, and textile industries. A similar 
pattern was noted in science and technology. Collaborative problem solving 
processes are embraced by the health care industry, as well as by 
institutions and agencies that fund social programs and initiatives. (xvii)  
 
Malone (2004) attributes the increase in collaborative partnerships to a change in the very 
nature of work, a change made possible because of the decreased cost of communication 
and increased availability of information. These trends give people the choice to 
participate on projects that are personally rewarding. This is substantially different from 
choosing to work for an organization and then being assigned to a project of the 
organization’s choice.   
Collaborations in academics also face significant barriers to achieving success and 
rarely perform as intended (Kiesler, 2003). In fact, the number of institutions 
participating in the collaboration is inversely related to their success (Cummings and 
Kiesler, 2005, Olson, et. al, 2005). A study of 62 NSF-sponsored projects found that, as 
the number of institutions involved in a collaboration increased, the level of success 
decreased (Cummings and Kiesler, 2005). Studying the growth process during the early 
stages in collaborative partnerships in these contexts could increase the possibility for 
successful outcomes.  
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Laboratory experiments 
Two categories of laboratory experiments that could be fruitful are those experiments that 
specifically test interventions in the growth process, and those that test how people might 
use models and simulations to make better policy decisions.  
Growth experiments 
Many of the interventions proposed in the model development section could also be 
translated into laboratory experiments. Interesting insights into the dynamics of the 
growth process might result from testing different rates of growth, conducting small 
groups before merging the groups together, and evaluating the influence of facilitators 
with different attributes. Another interesting series of tests could determine the robustness 
of strong-chain groups in the face of different destabilizing events such as the 
replacement of participants, the addition of multiple participants, or the addition of noise 
to the environment.  
Agent-based model experiments 
One potentially interesting series of experiments could test how accurately people can 
make policy decisions on the basis of using the agent-based models in this research. An 
agent-based model can be designed to include a series of interventions (slow growth, 
small chains, facilitators, etc.) that can be used to navigate an environment with different 
characteristics (low average-attitudes, deadlines, limited resources, etc.). In order to get 
an indication of performance, for every environment there would be a theoretically 
optimal set of interventions that could be compared to the subject’s choices. Subjects 
could be tested to see whether they could learn to use the model to make better decisions 
over time, to try and identify the type of information that leads to better decisions, and to 
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gain insights on the ways in which top-down decisions go awry when made in an 
environment that is dependent on bottom-up processes.  
Conclusion 
The use of collaborative partnerships to implement the Nurse Family Partnership in 
Colorado enables new forms of program implementations with intriguing potential 
benefits. What if successful collaborative partnerships are not just slightly better but 
radically better than other implementation strategies? What if the difference between a 
successful and not successful collaboration is largely determined by the controllable 
factors during the planning process? If variations in performance are largely based on 
early, measurable, interactions, can we catch low performing groups, dissolve them 
before committing too many resources, and then start fresh? Could targeted interventions 
help steer these collaborations down the right path and protect them from threats to 
sustainability? The current research suggests that the growth process indeed matters and 
when managed appropriately the thoughtful inclusion of new participants and a 
deliberative planning process can help realize the potential of collaborative partnerships. 
Hopefully, the use of collaborative partnerships will be seen as a viable implementation 
option for what soon could become a nation-wide, $15B Nurse Family Partnership 
program.  
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The Context of the Collaboration 
  
 
  1.  Our collaborative effort was started because we wanted to do something 
about an important problem. 
 
 
















 1.  The membership of our group included those stakeholders affected by the 
issue. 
    2.  Our membership was not dominated by any one group or sector. 
    3.  Our collaboration has access to credible information that supports problem 
solving and decision making. 
    4.  Stakeholders have agreed on what decisions will be made by the group. 
    5.  Stakeholders have agreed to work together on this issue. 
    6.  Our group has set ground rules and norms about how we will work 
together. 
    7.  We have a method for communicating the activities and decisions of the 
group to all members 















   1.  Members were more interested in getting a good group decision than 
improving the position of their home organization. 
 
 






  3.  Members trusted each other sufficiently to honestly and accurately share 
information, perceptions, and feedback. 
    4.  Members are willing to let go of an idea for one that appears to have more 
merit. 












The Collaboration Process 




  2.  The openness and credibility of the process helped members set aside 
doubts and skepticism. 
    3.  We set aside vested interests to achieve our common goal. 
    4.  We have an effective decision making process. 
 








The Results of the Collaboration 
 
 




   2.  The time and effort of the collaboration were directed at obtaining the 
goals rather than keeping the collaboration in business. 
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Appendix 2: Process Quality Instrument 
The following is a brief survey for evaluating the overall quality of a process.  “Process” 
refers to how a group of people is working together to deal with a problem they have in 
common or a goal they are trying to achieve.  When you rate the following items, you 
should be thinking of the following group: The Community Coalition working on the 
following problem or goal:  The Nurse Home Visitation Program. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to this survey.  Regardless of what you think, you 
can be sure that there are others who will agree with you.  Please rate all of items.  When 
you have finished, please look back over the items on more time, to see if you have left 
any items unrated.  Please circle the scale interval that best represents your evaluation of 
the process. 
 
1. The people involved in the process usually are focused on broader goals, rather than individual agendas. 
Strongly Agree  Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
2. The process is free of favoritism. 
Strongly Agree  Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
3. Often decisions are made in advance and simply confirmed by the process. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
4. In the process, everyone has an equal opportunity to influence decisions. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
5. The process gives some people more than they deserve, while shortchanging others. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
6. The process responds fairly to the needs of its members. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
7. Decisions made in the process are based on fair criteria. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
8. In the process, some people’s “merits” are taken for granted while other people are asked to justify 
themselves. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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9. In the process, strings are being pulled from the outside, which influence important decisions. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
10. The allocation of resources is decided fairly. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
11. The criteria for allocations are fairly applied. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
12. In the process there is sufficient opportunity to challenge decisions. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
13. In discussions about decisions or procedures, some people are discounted because of the organization they 
represent. 
Strongly Agree Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
14. The decisions made in the process are consistent. 
Strongly Agree  Agree Agree more than disagree Disagree more than agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
15. Decisions are based on accurate information. 
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